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STUDENT COMMENTS
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATIONS
IN THE RETAIL CHAIN INDUSTRY
The initial issue to be resolved in any union organizational cam-
paign is that of the appropriateness of the petitioning union's requested
bargaining unit. The National Labor Relations Board is often called
upon to resolve disputes as to this matter, pursuant to its authority
under Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 1
Section 9(b) 'gives broad discretion to the Board in its exercise of this
responsibility, requiring only that, in weighing the conflicting claims of
management and the unions, the Board "assure to employees the full-
est freedom" in exercising the rights to organize and be represented by
the bargaining agent of their choice?
The interests of union and management in representation cases
come into conflict over the size of the bargaining units established
under section 9(b), since each side generally seeks the unit that it feels
will be most conducive to its victory in a representation election. In
organizing retail chains the unions have generally sought small units,
often ones containing only a single store in a chain, due to the relative
ease with which such units can be organized!' Retail chain employers
have generally sought to impose upon the unions the more difficult task
of organizing larger, multistore groupings. In addition, since retail
chain operations are often characterized by a high degree of adminis-
trative centralization, retail employers tend to favor bargaining units
which conform to their administrative districts and accordingly do not
threaten to fragment their operations. This comment will assume that
a policy favoring single-store units as presumptively appropriate is
1 Section 9(b) provides that: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in
order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by
this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be
the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)
(1970).
The Board has wide discretion in the area of unit determinations; its decisions will
not be overturned unless they are shown to be "arbitrary and capricious." NLRB v.
Lou De Young's Mkt. Basket, Inc., 406 F.2d 17, 23-24 (6th Cir. 1969); accord, NLRB
v. Li'l Gen. Stores, Inc., 422 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Sun Drug Co., 359 F.2d
408 (3d Cir. 1966). For findings of abuse of discretion, see, e.g., NLRB v. Davis Cafe-
teria, Inc., 396 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1968) ; NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc. (Say-More
Food Stores), 376 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.' 1967).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). Section 7 outlines the rights protected: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations .. •
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1970).
3
 The Board's recent policy of favoring single-store units has been "an organizational
life saver" for the labor unions; one union official has indicated that "'the single unit
policy has put us ten years ahead of where we would have been.' " Sirkin and Yeomans,
Effects of the NLRB's Unit Policies in the Retail Chain Store Industry, 23 Lab. L.J.
80, 97 (1972).
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essential for the protection of the organizational and representational
rights of retail chain employees.'
The Board is not strictly bound by its own precedents in exercis-
ing its discretionary power to make unit determinations. Historically,
however, it has adhered to certain policies which can be detected in
its decisions. It has utilized two major tests for retail store unit
appropriateness, one looking to the extent of union organization and
the other to the degree of local autonomy. In determining the degree of
local autonomy, it has relied primarily upon three criteria: local man-
agerial independence, geographical proximity, and employee inter-
change. It will be submitted, however, that the Board has redefined and
inconsistently applied these criteria and by so doing has made major
shifts in policy. On the whole these shifts have been made sub silentio;
the Board has rarely articulated reasons for the changes.
This comment undertakes to trace the pattern of change insofar
as it is discernible in the Board's application of its tests and criteria
for determination of appropriate retail store bargaining units. It will
focus first upon the pre-1947 period of reliance on the extent of union
organization and then upon the decade, ending in 1962, when the
Board restrictively defined the criteria by which it tested for local
autonomy and rarely found a single-store unit appropriate but rather
favored larger units composed of administrative divisions. The com-
ment will then examine what has come to be known as the Board's
Say-On policy, developed during the decade since 1962, wherein the
Board so applied and redefined the three criteria that it consistently
approved of single-store units. Finally, it will be submitted that a
recent series of decisions reveals a new pattern of Board vacillation.
Such cases as Twenty-First Centdry Restaurant Corp." and Gray Drug
Stares, Inc.,' which rejected single-store units, were succeeded but not
explicitly overruled by Walgreen Co., 7 which reaffirmed the appropri-
ateness of such units. The uncertainty produced by Walgreen's about-
face, coming as it does after a history of major and unexplained policy
changes, underlines the urgent need for the Board to fix its standards
and to clarify its current policy.
I. EARLY UNIT DETERMINATIONS: THE "EXTENT
OF ORGANIZATION" AND "Safeway" PERIODS
In its quest for appropriate units for the retail chain industry, the
Board has
 sought units composed of employees with a "community of
4 During the ten years following its decision in Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B.
1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962), discussed at notes 47-63, the Board has explicitly stated
the same assumption. See, e.g., Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 67 L.R.R.M. 1289,
1291 (1968): "Absent a bargaining history in a more comprehensive unit or functional
integration of a sufficient degree to obliterate separate identity, the employees' 'fullest
freedom' is maximized, we believe, by treating the employees in a single store or
restaurant of a retail chain operation as normally constituting an appropriate unit for
collective-bargaining purposes."
5 192 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 78 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1971).
197 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 80 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1972).
7 198 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 81 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1972).
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interests," which is usually interpreted to mean common skills and
working conditions. 8 In assessing "community of interests" the two
main tests which the Board historically has considered are the extent
of union organization° and the degree of local autonomy possessed by
the retail store(s)."
The Board's earliest retail chain unit determinations approved
both single-store" and city-wide" bargaining units. The Board often
based these earliest determinations primarily upon the petitioning
union's extent of organization and largely excluded other factors;"
the fact that workers in part of an employer's chain were unique in
their desire for unionization was used as the key indicator of appro-
priateness." The Board's main justification for this "extent of organi-
zation" doctrine was a desire to expedite the stages preliminary to the
commencement of collective bargaining "lest prolonged delay expose
the organized employees to the temptation of striking to obtain recog-
nition ..
However, it was felt in Congress that the Board's unquestioning
acceptance of unit requests was an abandonment of the responsibility
imposed upon the Board by section 9(b) to determine whether or not
a unit was appropriate. In the debate over the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments in 1947, Senator Robert Taft summed up this congressional
criticism: "The extent-of-organization theory has been used where all
valid tests fail to give the union what it desires and represents a sur-
render by the Board of its duty to determine appropriate units."'
Congressional reaction to the Board's extent of organization approach
culminated in the enactment in 1947 of Section 9(c) (5) of the NLRA,"
which prohibits the Board from using extent of organization as the
controlling factor in unit determinations. It may be surmised that the
statute's prohibition against controlling use in no way impairs the
viability of extent of organization as a factor.
The Board's initial reaction to the passage of section 9(c) (5)
8 See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 307, 308-09, 54 L.R.R.M. 1043, 1044
(1963); Great A & P Tea Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 342, 343-44, 46 L.R.R.M. 1314 (1960).
9 E.g., Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1035, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1962) ;
First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 26 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1280, 7 L.R.R.M. 45 (1940).
10 E.g., Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1034-35, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153
(1962); Great A & P Tea Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 680, 681, 24 L.R.R.M. 1454 (1949). The
Board has also treated the employer's past bargaining history as an important test in
some cases. See, e.g., Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1096, 40 L.R.R.M. 1322
(1957); Spartan Dep't Stores, 140 N.L.R.B. 608, 52 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1963).
11 E.g., Koppers Stores, 73 N.L.R.B. 504, 20 L.R.R.M. 1003 (1947).
12 E.g., First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 1346, 14 L.R.R.M. 91 (1944).
18 E.g., First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 26 N.L.R.B. 1275, 7 L.R.R.M. 45 (1940); First Nat'l
Stores, Inc., 55 N.L.R.B. 1346, 14 L.R.R.M. 91 (1944).
14 See cases cited in note 13 supra.
15 Garden State Hosiery Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 318, 321, 20 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1947).
16 93 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1947).
17 Section 9(c)(5) provides that: "In determining whether a unit is appropriate .. .
the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling." 29 U.S.C.
159(c)(5) (1970).
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appeared to be a sharp about-face. Not only did it limit its use of the
extent of organization test, but it developed a virtual presumption
against the appropriateness of single-store units. Requests for single-
store" and less than division-wide multistore" units were denied, even
when the extent of organization, accompanied by other factors such
as geographic isolation, pointed to the appropriateness of such units."
The Board was willing to approve single-store units" and less than
division-wide multistore units22 only when this approval was unequiv-
ocally necessitated by geography or extreme local managerial inde-
pendence. In 1951 the Board gave this post-1947 policy a definitive
formulation in Safeway Stores, Inc.: 2' "absent unusual circumstances,
the appropriate collective bargaining unit in the retail . . . trade should
embrace all employees within the categories sought who perform their
work within the Employer's administrative division or [geographic]
area."" Thereafter, the Board's preference for multistore units which
encompassed either administrative districts or geographic areas was
continuously reaffirmed for more than a decade."
During this decade, as the Board continued to deny single-store
units," it came to rely primarily upon the degree of local autonomy
possessed by the retail store 2 7
 The most important indicium of local
autonomy was the degree of local managerial independence, measured
in terms of the distribution of authority between local store managers
and district or area managers.' The geographic proximity of the stores
within a proposed unit was also considered, often in contrast to the
proximity of these stores to those excluded from the proposed unit."
Similar evaluations were made with respect to the degree of employee
interchange 80
In testing for local autonomy, the Board applied these three
criteria in a manner which discouraged single-store and less than
18
 E.g., Westbrook Enterprises, Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 1032, 22 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1948).
12
 E.g., C. Pappas Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1272, 23 L.R.R.M. 1227 (1948).
20 Grand Union Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 1016, 23 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1949), overruled by
V.J. Elmore 50, 10R & $1.00 Stores, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 1505, 30 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1952).
21
 E.g., American Stores Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 882, 23 L.R.R.M. 1627 (1949).
22 E.g., Walgreen Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1168, 37 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1955).
22 96 N.L.R.B. 998, 28 L.R.R.M. 1622 (1951).
24
 Id. at 1000, 28 L.R.R.M. at 1622. To substantiate this position, the Board cited
Kroger Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 194, 25 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1950); C. Pappas Co., 80 N.L.R.B
1272, 23 L.R.R.M. 1227 (1948),
25 E.g., Paxton Wholesale Grocery Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 316, 43 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1959);
Food Fair Stores, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 521, 36 L.R.R.M. 1607 (1955); see Daw Drug Co.,
127 N.L.R.B. 1316, 1319, 46 L.R.R.M. 1218, 1219 (1960).
28 E.g., Paxton Wholesale Grocery Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 316, 43 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1959);
Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1096, 40 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1957); Sparkle Mkts.
Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 790, 36 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1955).
27
 E.g., United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 409, 32 L.R.R.M. 1145
(1953).
28 See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 521, 36 L.R.R.M. 1607 (1955).
29 E.g., Weis Mkts., Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 148, 151, 45 L.R.R.M. 1094, 1095 (1959).
80
 E.g., Crown Drug Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1127, 34 L.R.R.M. 1141, 1142 (1954).
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division-wide multistore units. While full local authority over hiring,
discharging, wage increases and promotions indicated that single-store
units might be appropriate,81 the Board usually concluded that local
managerial independence was lacking even when only minor chain
influence was apparent. 32 The Board also paid close attention to cen-
tralization of such administrative functions as advertising83 and record-
keeping" in gauging local managerial independence. Relatively low
levels of employee interchange were viewed by the Board as negating
local autonomy; for example, the Board found "frequent" interchange
in one case where there were five transfers per month among forty-
eight stores." There was also a tendency to find geographic "proxim-
ity" between relatively distant stores." In sum, the Board's applica-
tion of the standards of local autonomy tended to insure that the
"unusual circumstances"' required by Safeway for a finding of an
appropriate single-store unit were not often discovered.
The Board established this large-unit policy solely by means of
its restrictive definition of the standards of local autonomy. At no
point during the Safeway period did the Board attempt to explain its
reasons for the policy or to justify it in terms of the necessity of assur-
ing to employees "the fullest freedom" of self-organization." The
Board's policy may have been based on an interpretation of section
81 E.g., Walgreen Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1168, 37 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1955).
32 See, e.g., Weis Mkts., Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 148, 45 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1959); Father &
Son Shoe Stores, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 1479, 40 L.R.R.M. 1032 (1957); Food Fair Stores,
Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 521, 36 L.R.R.M. 1607 (1955).
83 E.g., Quality Food Mkts., Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 349, 350, 45 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1960).
34 E.g., Paxton Wholesale Grocery Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 316, 317, 43 L.R.R.M. 1424,
1425 (1959).
35 Father & Son Shoe Stores, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 1479, 40 L.R.R.M. 1032 (1957);
see Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1340, 1343, 41 L.R.R.M. 1288, 1289 (1958). In
most cases during the Safeway period, the Board stated, without providing substantiation,
that there was "frequent" or "some" interchange. E.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 124
N.L.R.B. 908, 911, 44 L.R.R.M. 1533, 1534 (1959); Food Fair Stores, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B.
521, 522, 36 L.R.R.M. 1607 (1955).
80 See, e.g., Bonwit Teller, Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 414, 417 n.9, 419, 24 L.R.R.M. 1283
(1949) (stores twenty-five miles apart considered "proximate"); Father & Son Shoe
Stores, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 1479, 40 L.R.R.M. 1032 (1957) (stores fifteen to one hundred
and ninety miles away added to requested unit).
37 Safeway Stores, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 998, 1000, 28 L.R.R.M. 1622 (1951).
88 In a 1964 case rejecting the Safeway approach, Members Leedom and Jenkins
presented a possible justification for Safeway in their dissenting opinion. Frisch's Big Boy
Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 553-57, 56 L.R.R.M. 1246, 1247-49 (1964). They main,
tamed that there was an identity of interests among employees in a highly centralized
chain possessing uniform wages and working conditions; they argued that "the contract
terms with the union selected by the employees in the single-restaurant unit will un-
doubtedly have a potent impact on the terms and conditions of employment of all the
other employees in the chain." Id. at 557, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1248. While it is possible that
a similar policy consideration formed the basis of the Board's Safeway policy, this is
unlikely since the issue of the impact of union contract terms on unorganized employees
was never mentioned in the Safeway line of cases.
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9(c) (5) as disfavoring single-location units, although the section's
legislative history indicates that this was not the intent of Congress."
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE
SINGLE-STORE PRESUMPTION
In 1961 the Board, after a change in membership," decided Hot
Shoppes, Inc., 41 which indicated that the Safeway policy of refusing to
approve single-store or less than diVision-wide multistore units was
about to be abandoned. The Board stated in Hot Shoppes that the
availability of appropriate larger units did not militate against finding
the smaller unit appropriate.42 Then, in 1962, the Board made the
decisive break with its prior policy of unit determinations that had
been forecast by Hot Shoppes. In Say-On Drugs, Inc.,43
 the Board
adopted the position that the retail chain employees' right to self-
organization was impeded by the Board's post-Saf eway overemphasis
on administrative divisions and underemphasis on geographic remote-
ness, local managerial autonomy, and extent of union organization."
In order to alter this mistaken emphasis, the Board added the possibil-
ity that single-store units might be appropriate even despite the absence
of unusual circumstances that Safeway had required. The Board noted
that in "innumerable" instances the organizational desires of employees
had been thwarted under the Safeway policy of requiring large-scale,
multistore organizational drives in situations where single-store units
should have been found appropriate." The Board directed an election
in a single-store unit because of the local manager's full control over
hiring of part-time employees, "geographic separation," the "infre-
quent" employee interchange, and the extent of union organization."
"J Senator Robert Taft explained the limited intent of section 9(c)(5): "Opponents
of the bill have stated that it prevents the establishment of small operational units and
effectively prevents organization of . . . businesses whose operations are widespread. It is
sufficient answer to say that the Board has evolved numerous tests to determine appro-
priate units, such as community of interest of, employees involved, extent of common
supervision, interchange of employees, geographical considerations, etc., any one of which
may justify the finding of a small unit." 93 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1947).
40 In 1961 President Kennedy appointed Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown
to the Board.
41
 130 N.L.R.B. 138, 47 L.R.R.M. 1258 (1961).
41
 Id. at 141 n.12. The Board is not required to find the perfect or best possible
unit; it is only required to find an appropriate unit. See Agawam Food Mart, Inc., 162
N.L.R.B. 1420, 1423, 64 L.R.R.M. 1197, 1199 (1967). For a discussion which maintains
that the Board should seek the most appropriate unit, see Rains, Determination of the
Appropriate Bargaining Unit by the NLRB: A Lack of Objectivity Perceived, 8 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev, 175 (1967).
45
 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962).
44 Id. at 1033, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
45
 Id. at 1033-34 & n.4, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153 & n.4.
40 Id. at 1034-35, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153. The store managers were in charge of day-
to-day operations; they could interview full-time applicants and make recommendations.
Id. The Board played down Say-On's importance by stating that it had "simply added
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The significance of Say-on was formally recognized by the Board
two years later, in Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc. 47 In this case, Say-On
was characterized as an abandonment of the Board's "prior general
policy of making unit determinations in [the retail chain] industry
coextensive with the employer's administrative division or the involved
geographic area." Say-On had analogized single stores to single plants
for unit determination purposes;" since Section 9(b) of the NLRA"
has been interpeted by the Board as creating a presumption that single-
plant units are appropriate," Frisch's Big Boy completed the plant/
store analogy by ruling that a single-store unit is presumptively appro-
priate."
In Say-On and Frisch's Big Boy the Board continued to deal with
the same criteria that it had used in the Safeway period—local man-
agerial independence, employee interchange, and geographic proximity
—to assess the factor of local autonomy. However, the Board's defini-
tion of "significant" managerial independence, "close" geographic
proximity, and "substantial" employee interchange was altered sig-
nificantly. For example, in later cases which relied on Say-On, the
Board de-emphasized such administrative functions as centralized
recordkeeping while stressing the extent of actual local managerial
independence. 53 The Board in one post-Say-On decision pointed out
that:
[m] ore significant [than centralized administrative func-
tions] is whether or not the employees perform their day-
to-day work under the immediate supervision of a local store
manager who is involved in rating employee performance, or
in performing a significant portion of the hiring and firing of
the employees, and is personally involved with the daily
matters which make up their grievances and routine prob-
lems."
the possibility—as in manufacturing and other multiplant enterprises—that a single loca-
tion or grouping other than an administrative division or geographical area may be
appropriate."Id. at 1033-34 n.4, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153 n.4. See also Weis Mkts., Inc.,
142 N.L.R.B. 708, 53 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1963).
47 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 56 L.R.R.M 1246 (1964) (representation case), 151 N.L.R.B.
454, 58 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1965) (unfair labor practice case), enforcement denied, 356
F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
48 147 N.L.R.B. at 551, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1247.
43 See the statement in the Say-On decision which is quoted in note 46 supra.
so 29
	 § 159(b) (1970).
5' Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551 n.1, 56 L.R.R.M. 1246, 1247 n.1
(1964). In support of this position the Board cited a case in which it had ruled that:
"A single-plant unit, being one of the unit types listed in [section 9(b)1 . . . as appro-
priate for bargaining purposes, is presumptively appropriate." Dixie Belle Mills, Inc.,
139 N.L.R.B. 629, 51 L.R.R.M. 1344 (1962) (footnote omitted).
52 147 N.L.R.B. at 551 & n.1, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1247 & n.1.
53
 E.g., Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 878, 67 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1291 (1968) ;
Allied Stores, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 966, 71 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1969).
54
 Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 878, 67 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1291 (1968).
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Thus, after Say-On, the Board developed a willingness to look beyond
the employer's centralized administrative functions to the actual day-
to-day authority of store managers. This approach, when coupled with
the Board's recognition that ordinarily "the individual store managers
represent the highest level of supervisory authority present in the
stores for a substantial majority of the time,"" significantly modified
evaluation of the standard of local managerial independence. In apply-
ing this revised criterion in the post-Say-On cases the Board became
willing to find managerial independence sufficient to justify a single-
store unit where the local manager could not hire full-time employees
but did have some influence regarding acceptance of applicants for
part-time work." It is apparent that the Board had become reluctant
to let limited local managerial authority block the employees' freedom
of self-organization.
In evaluating standards other than managerial independence which
indicate the degree of local autonomy possessed by a retail store, the
Board in one post-Say-On case found interchange involving twelve
percent of the work force per month no obstacle to single-store units."
In the same case, the presence of excluded stores "within a few blocks"
did not create sufficient geographic proximity to negate the appro-
priateness of a single store unit," while in other cases a distance of
three miles showed "geographic separation 7S' and a four mile separa-
tion demonstrated "different competitive markets,"" pointing to the
appropriateness of single-store units.
In sum, the Board after Say-On utilized
 the criteria' of local
65 Grand Union Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 230, 232, 71 L.R.R.M. 1216, 1218 (1969). The
Board noted that regional supervisors made visits to each store on the average of "2.5
times per week" but concluded that this presence of supervisors, even if many of their
visits lasted "an entire day," would not negate local managerial independence. Id. at 231-
32, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1218.
a 3 Agawam Food Mart, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1420, 64 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1967). The
Board never specifically referred to the distribution of hiring authority with respect to
full-time employees. The Board's protracted discussion of the local manager's minor role
in hiring part-time employees creates a strong inference that local managers played an
even smaller role in the hiring of full-time employees. Accord, May Dep't Stores Co.,
175 N.L.R.B. 514, 71 L.R.R.M. 1026 (1969); Purity Food Stores, Inc. (Say-More Food
Stores), 160 N.L.R.B. 651, 63 L.R.R.M. 1007 (1966), enforcement denied, 376 F.2d 497
(1st Cir. 1967).
67 Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 552, 56 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1964).
58 Id. at 554 (dissenting opinion).
59
 Agawam Food Mart, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1420, 64 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1967).
eo Primrose Super Mkt., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 610, 57 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1964), enforced
without opinion, (1st Cir.) (unreported), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965), rehearing
denied, 353 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1965).
01 In further contrast to the approach of the Safeway period, in Sav-On and subse-
quent cases the Board often noted that "no labor organization is seeking to represent
employees on a broader basis." Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1035, 51 L.R.R.M.
1152, 1153 (1962); Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 553, 56 L.R.R.M.
1246, 1247 (1964). While such statements did not indicate that the Board had reverted
to its original policy of relying primarily on the union's extent of organization, they did
demonstrate use of this test as a means of emphasizing that there need be only a finding
of an appropriate unit.
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managerial independence, geographic proximity and employee inter-
change in a manner that customarily allowed a finding of an appro-
priate single-store unit. The Board summarized this development in
one post-Say-On case: "Our experience has led us to conclude that a
single store in a retail chain, like single locations in multistore enter-
prises in other industries, is presumptively an appropriate unit for
bargaining. In cases subsequent to Say-On Drugs, we have consistently
found such units appropriate unless countervailing factors were pres-
ent."°2 The Board had adopted a balanced, case-by-case approach to
unit determinations; single-store units were rejected only in those rare
instances where the cumulative effect of substantial employee inter-
change and the complete absence of local control over hiring, firing,
and promotions rebutted the presumptive appropriateness of single-
store units.° It is submitted, then, that the Board after Say-On allowed
retail chain employees the fullest possible exercise of their right of
self-organization by favoring the single-store unit.
III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: VACILLATION IN BOARD POLICY,
CULMINATING IN Gray Drug Stores AND Walgreen
Since the 1961 change in Board membership noted above may be
considered a partial explanation for the Board's departure in Say-On
from its prior policy, it might be thought that this same factor is a
sufficient explanation for the more recent and dramatic unit policy
fluctuations described below. However, it should be noted at the outset
that changes in membership appear to be of little use in explaining the
latest changes in unit policies.°4
A. Revival of the Safeway Approach Regarding Single-Store Units
Four recent cases have indicated Board reinterpretation of the
criteria which demonstrate local autonomy and hence Board movement
away from Say-On's endorsement of single-store units. In the 1969
02 Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 67 L.R.R.M. 1284, 1290 (1968).
63 See Horn & Hardart Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 988, 67 L.R.R.M. 1512 (1968); Pep
Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, 172 N.L.R.B. No, 23, 68 L.R.R.M. 1308 (1968); Star Mkt.
Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 68 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1968).
04 The same Board, composed of Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning,
Jenkins, Brown and Zagoria, which developed the Say-On line of cases unanimously
decided, in 1969, the first case to depart from Say-On (Mott's Shop-Rite, Inc., 174
N.L.R.B. 1116, 70 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1969)). Two 1971 cases that went against Say-On
were decided by Chairman Miller and Member Kennedy with Member Fanning dis-
senting (Twenty-First Century Restaurant Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 78 L.R.R.M.
1015 (1971); Waiakamilo Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 78 L.R.R.M. 1018 (1971)).
In 1972 a similar case was decided by Chairman Miller and Members Kennedy and
Penello with Members Fanning and Jenkins dissenting (Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 197
N,L.R.B, No. 105, 80 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1972)), while another 1972 case that returned to
Say-On was the unanimous decision of Members Fanning, Kennedy and Penello (Wal-
green Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 81 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1972)). All five cases are discussed
in detail infra.
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decision Mott's Shop-Rite, Inc.,85 the Board found an absence of local
authority in spite of local power to hire and fire part-time employees
and to discipline and recommend discharge of full-time employees."
In a finding reminiscent of the Safeway approach, the Board empha-
sized the geographic "proximity" of stores which were seven to thirty-
four miles away from the requested unit store 8 7 An even greater
departure from the Say-On approach came in 1971 with Twenty-First
Century Restaurant Corp." and Waiakamilo Corp." In Twenty-First
Century the Board found a proposed single-store unit inappropriate
because local managers possessed only "minimal" discretion," because
of occasional employee transfers among the stores,Ti and on the basis
of geographic proximity—the seven stores in the administrative district
which included the requested store fell within a ten mile radius." Sig-
nificantly, the manager's "minimal" discretion included complete au-
thority over most hiring," most training, and some firing," as well as
effective power over all discharges, raises and work schedules." In
Waiakamilo the Board accepted the employer's argument that a unit
of one of five restaurants within a fifteen mile radius would "unduly
fragmentize" its business." The Board found that employee transfers
involving less than one percent of the total work force per month"
OD 174 N.L.R.B. 1116, 70 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1969).
ea Id. The Board also found "substantial", employee interchange. Id. at 1117, 70
L.R.R.M. at 1390. Although in certain cases the Board had found single-store units
inappropriate before Mott's Shop-Rite, the unusual factual situations make these cases
clearly distinguishable from Say-On. See text at note 63 supra. One 1967 Board decision
is less clearly distinguishable from Say-On, although there was significantly less local
autonomy in this case than in Mott's Shop-Rite. See Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., 162
N.L.R.B. 676, 64 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1967).
67 174 N.L.R.B. 1116, 70 L.R.R.M. 1388. For discussion of the Safeway approach
see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
ea 192 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 78 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1971).
69 192 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 78 L.R.R.M. 1018 (1971).
70 78 L.R.R.M. at 1016 (1971).
71 The interchange involved less than two percent of the entire work force per
month. Id. The transfers were apparently of short duration for the • purpose of special
promotional efforts; there was evidence that regular, day-to-day employee interchange
was nonexistent. Id. at 1018 (dissenting opinion). Temporary and irregular transfers,
such as those precipitated by the promotional efforts, have traditionally been given little
weight by the Board. See, e.g., Walgreen Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 81 L.R.R.M. 1065,
1066 (1972) (Regional Director's Decision); Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1340,
1343, 41 L.R.R.M. 1288, 1289 (1958).
72 78 L.R.R.M. at 1015-16.
78 The store manager had full control over hiring at the minimum wage rate, but
needed approval for hiring at higher rates. Id. at 1015. Most employees were hired at
the minimum wage. Id. at 1017 (dissenting opinion).
74 Id. at 1015-16; see the dissenting opinion at 1017.
75 Id. at 1017-18 (dissenting opinion). The store manager was technically empow-
ered to recommend raises and discharges. However, the dissent indicates that the store
manager's recommendations were never overruled by the district manager. Id.
70 192 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 78 L.R.R.M. 1018, 1019 (1971) (Regional Director's
Decision).
77 Id. at 1020 & n.7 (dissenting opinion).
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and that total local control over all hiring and some discharges" con-
stituted "frequent" transfers and "little [local] discretion," thus
necessitating a multistore unit."
The fourth decision, Gray Drug Stores, Inc." also reveals a
change in the content and application of unit determination standards
and accordingly a weakening of the presumptive appropriateness of
single-store units. The petitioners, a local of the Retail Clerks Union,
sought a representation election in a unit which contained the em-
ployer's eleven retail drug stores in Dade County, Florida, and which
cut across two of the employer's administrative subdivisions." Alter-
natively, the union sought single unit elections for each of the eleven
stores.' The employer maintained that the appropriate unit should in-
clude all thirty stores in its Florida Division. 83 The store managers in
Gray Drug were admittedly in charge of day-to-day operations and
direction of the work force." They interviewed and evaluated prospec-
tive employees, hired employees "in certain circumstances," had au-
thority to suspend and discipline, and were consulted by district
managers on evaluation and promotion of employees.85 Furthermore,
"soda fountain managers" could "effectively recommend" the hire of
new employees." The Board felt these facts failed to demonstrate
local managerial independence and found that this lack of indepen-
dence, together with "frequent interchange"" and "geographic prox-
78 Store managers could hire and train employees. They could discharge employees
for pilferage or insubordination. Id. at 1019 n.4. The dissent maintained that "for all
practical purposes" employees could be discharged by the local managers. Id. at 1020.
79 Id. at 1019-20.
80 197 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 80 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1972). Although the Board approved
single-store units in the period between Twenty-First Century and Gray Drug, their
unique factual situations may have been determinative. See Angell's Super Valu, 197
N.L.R.B. No. 22, 80 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1972) (minimum geographic separation was ninety-
two miles) ; Short Stop, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 78 L.R.R.M. 1087 (1971) (employer
conceded the appropriateness of single-store units). But cf. Angelus Furniture Mfg. Co.,
192 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 78 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1971).
81 80 L.R.R.M. at 1449-51.
82 Id. at 1449.
88 Id.
84 Id. at 1450.
85 Id. In contrast to the practice of the post-Sav-On cases, the Board did not men-
tion the crucial question of the extent to which the district managers followed the store
managers' recommendations in these areas. See Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 881
n.15 (1968). As a further anomaly, the Board stressed "effective" authority as the basis
for excluding soda fountain managers from the unit. 80 L.R.R.M. at 1452. On the other
hand, the Board in Gray Drug took careful note of the extent of centralized administrative
functions. Id, at 1450.
86 80 L.R.R.M. at 1452. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
87 80 L.R.R.M. at 1451. There was approximately seven percent interchange per
month among the thirty Florida Division stores. Id. at 1450-51. The interchange was
occasioned by such special events as new store openings; there was no regular, day-to-
day interchange. Id. The Board usually gives little weight to this type of interchange.
See note 71 supra. The Board did not present any figures specifically dealing with the
eleven Dade County stores, nor did it compare transfers within the proposed unit with
transfers to excluded stores. This constitutes a departure from the Say-On approach.
Cf. Crown Drug Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1127, 34 L.R.R.M. 1141, 1142 (1954).
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imity,“88
 "negate [d] the identity”" of the requested single-store
units.
When read together, Mott's Shop-Rite, Twenty-First Century,
Waiakamilo and Gray Drug demonstrate that, although the Board
continued to profess adherence to the presumptive appropriateness of
single-store units and to deal with the standards of local managerial
independence, interchange, and geographic proximity, it had come to
consider the single-store presumption easily rebuttable if the employer
presented even a tenuous argument that local autonomy was lacking.
The Board had once again shifted its unit policy through a redefini-
tion of the significance of facts pointing to the existence of local
autonomy.
The Board's departure from Say-On's approval of single-store
units was most clearly manifested in the transformation of the Board's
standard of local managerial independence. During the Say-On period
the Board tried to weigh the impact of the local manager's authority,
no matter how limited, on the employees' day-to-day performance of
their work." Regardless of any veto reserved to higher authorities, if
there was actual local authority in the areas of hiring and firing or local
supervision and evaluation of employees, then there were strong
indications that an appropriate unit, though possibly not the most
appropriate unit, was present." The Board, in Mott's Shop-Rite,
Twenty-First Century, Waiakamilo and Gray Drug, appeared to have
discarded this approach for one which gave emphasis to the em-
ployer's professed distribution of managerial authority."
It should be noted that no alteration in the retail chain in-
dustry had precipitated Say-On's acceptance of single-store units. The
Board had found that this acceptance was necessitated by the need to
protect the employees' right to self-organization;" at the time when
Gray Drug was decided, nothing had changed so as to alleviate this
necessity. Further, the experience of retail chains after Say-On indi-
cated that, contrary to the predictions of retail chain employers," the
greater ease of self-organization made possible by the presumptive
appropriateness of single-store units did not interfere with manage-
ment's goal of maintaining highly centralized operations.65
 Thus, the
88
 80 L.R.R.M. at 1451. Paradoxically, the Board, while relying on the factor of




 See text at notes 55-56 supra.
91 See, e.g., Haag Drug Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 67 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1968). See note
42 supra.
92
 See, e.g., Waiakamilo Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 78 L.R.R.M. 1018, 1020
(1971) (dissenting opinion).
93
 Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1033, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152, 2153 (1962).
94
 E.g., Waiakamilo Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 78 L.R.R.M. 1018, 1019.(1971);
Purity Food Stores, Inc. (Say-More Food Stores), 160 N.L.R.B. 651, 652, 63 L.R.R.M.
1007, 1008 (1966).
915
 Sirkin and Yeomans, Effects of the NLRB's Unit •Policies in the Retail Chain
Store Industry, 23 Lab. L.J. 80, 96 (1972).
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policy reasons underlying Gray Drug's departure from Say-On are not
readily apparent. In fact, this departure could trigger noxious conse-
quences. For example, since it is essential to the functioning of many
chains that district or area managers retain at least a potential veto
over local managerial decisions, the view that such veto powers are
destructive of local autonomy would preclude the establishment of
otherwise appropriate single-store units in many instances. Further,
as noted by Member Fanning in his dissent in Twenty-First Century,
"To [the rank-and-file worker] the right of self-organization vouch-
safed by the Act seems a myth if hundreds of other chain employees
he may never see, whose immediate employment problems revolve
around their own local managers, must also be a part of the same
organizing effort!"90
B. A New Approach in Multistore Unit Determinations:
Emphasis on Employer Administrative Districts
Apart from its weakening of the presumptive appropriateness of
single-store units, Gray Drug, as pointed out by dissenting Members
Fanning and Jenkins, is also a "significant departure from . . . earlier
Board practice"' in the area of multistore unit determinations. In
spite of its history of fluctuations in the area of single-store retail unit
determinations, in the past the Board has held consistently that multi-
store units may be based either on administrative districts or on geo-
graphic areas." Gray Drug suggests that the Board now favors the
former.
After refusing the single-store unit, the Board, in Gray Drug,
turned to the union's request for a metropolitan area-wide unit and
noted that some stores on the fringe of the metropolitan area were
farther from its center than they were from some excluded stores on
the fringe of a neighboring county. Therefore the Board concluded
that the proposed unit would not constitute a distinct geographic area."
The Board continued: "But, more importantly, a unit of Dade County
stores would not reflect the separate community of interest which
stems from common supervision."'" Since the union's requested
multistore unit was neither geographically distinct nor, more signifi-
cantly, coextensive with the employer's administrative subdivisions,
the Board found appropriate a unit containing twice as many stores
and comprising two of the employer's districts."' The Board's state-
ment that conformity to administrative districts is more significant
than conformity to geographic areas strongly suggests that the Board
has rejected the use of these two criteria as distinct and equally viable
96 78 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
97 80 L.R.R.M. at 1453.
98 Id: at 1451.
99 Id.
100 Id, (emphasis added).
101 Id. at 14.50-52.
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bases for unit determinations, and has instead adopted an approach
which grants preeminence to units comprising complete administrative
districts.
It is unquestionably true that a geographically based unit is more
suitable for use in a working relationship between labor and manage-
ment when it is not only geographically cohesive but also coextensive
with the employer's administrative divisions. But the Board's statutory
task is merely to find an appropriate unit, not to determine the most
appropriate unit."' By requiring conformity to administrative dis-
tricts in multistore units the Board would be abandoning the responsi-
bilities imposed by the NLRA. 103 Prior to the amendments of 1947,
the Board allowed a similar abandonment to take place through its
"extent of organization" doctrine, which allowed extensive labor union
manipulation of bargaining unit size.'" Making administrative dis-
tricts determinative would give retail chain employers the capability
of fixing the size and shape of the employees' bargaining units. In
many cases the ability to control the size of the unit could prohibitively
increase the magnitude of the union's organizational task, thus enabling
the employer to determine the outcome of the representation election,
to the detriment of the union and the employees.'" Further, the exist-
ing problems in the area of multistore units will be compounded if the
Board readopts the approach to single-store units taken in Twenty-
First Century and Gray Drug, since a weakening of the single-store
alternative will create greater demand for multistore groupings.
C. Walgreen Co.: A Return to the Say-On Policy
The Board's movement away from Say-On's endorsement of
single-store units has been abruptly curtailed during its formative
stage. The recent case of Walgreen Co.' indicates continued Board
adherence to the interpretation of local autonomy which has pre-
102 See note 42 supra.
103 "The Board shall . . . assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by [the NLRA] ...." 29 U.S.C. 159(6) (1970).
104 See text at notes 13-16 supra.
lots In addition to enhancing the employer's power in the area of controlling the
size and shape of units based on administrative districts, the Board's decisions in Twenty-
First Century and Waiakamilo may be allowing employers too much leverage by confining
its consideration of local managerial autonomy to an examination of employer assertions
as to the nature and degree of local autonomy, such as the policies set forth in operations
manuals, Waiakamilo Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 78 L.R.R.M. 1018, 1020 (1971) (dis-
senting opinion). The willingness of employers to use these powers to defeat union
requests for small bargaining units is indicated by the actions of some employers in
analogous situations. For example, there is evidence that some employers have artificially
increased employee transfers so as to rebut the single unit appropriateness. Purity Food
Stores, Inc. (Say-More Food Stores), 160 N.L.R.B. 651, 658 n.16, 63 L.R.R.M. 1007,
1011 n.16 (1966); Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between
Stable Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 W. Res. L. Rev, 479, 497 & n.69
(1967).
100 198 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 81 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1972).
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vailed since Say-On. The petitioning union' in Walgreen sought a
single-store unit; the employer argued that an appropriate unit must
include its eleven retail drug stores in Dade County, Florida.'" The
store managers had authority over "most" hiring and could recom-
mend discharges, though these recommendations were always scruti-
nized and sometimes disapproved by the district manager.'" Initial
pay raises were routinely scheduled, although store managers did
possess authority to recommend later increases which were subject
to approval by the district manager.'" The Regional Director indi-
cated that these factors established local managerial independence."'
This independence, together with the absence of substantial employee
interchange," 2
 and in light of the three to fifteen mile separations be-
tween the proposed unit store and the excluded stores,' demonstrated
the appropriateness of the single-store unit.
The Board distinguished Walgreen from Gray Drug, primarily
on the grounds of differences in the number of visits by central manage-
ment personnel to the stores and the extent of local authority over
day-to-day operations. 114 However, the distinction between the visits
of undisclosed duration by district managers two to three times per
week in Gray Drug"' and the repeated visits by various regional
supervisors in Walgreen, often extending to "several days" in dura-
tion,'" would not appear sufficient to explain the opposite results.'"
The relative authorities of the local store managers in Walgreen and
Gray Drug appear, on balance, equivalent. While the Walgreen man-
agers had greater discretion in the area of hiring,'" the Gray Drug
107 Retail Clerks Union Local 1625 was the petitioner in both Walgreen and Gray
Drug.
108 81 L.R.R.M. at 1065, 1066.
109 Id. at 1065 (Regional Director's Decision).
110 Id. After two years' service, an employee's raises ceased to be routine. Id. Neither
the Regional Director nor the Board indicated the extent to which the store manager's
recommendations concerning subsequent raises were followed.
111 Id. at 1066.
112
 In a seven month period less than ten employees were transferred into or out
of the requested single-store unit. Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1066-67 (Board's Decision).
115 80 L.R.R.M. at 1450.
110 Each store was visited by two district managers once per month and by two
assistant district managers once per month. The former visits were of brief duration,
while the latter lasted "several days." 81 L.R.R.M. at 1065-66.
117
 This is particularly true in light of the fact that the Board has generally mini-
mized the importance of visits by central management personnel in the past. See note 55
Supra.
118 In Walgreen, the store manager hired "most" employees. 81 L.R.R.M. at 1065.
The power of the Gray Drug store managers to interview and evaluate prospective em-
ployees, as well as to hire them "in certain circumstances," is difficult to compare to the
power of Walgreen's managers, since the Board in Gray Drug did not examine the sig-
nificance of the district managers' "final say." 80 L.R.R.M. at 1450. Further, any such
comparison must consider that in Gray Drug soda fountain employees were effectively
hired at the local level. See text at note 86 supra.
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managers, unlike their Walgreen counterparts, had the authority to
suspend and discipline employees.'" Furthermore, the contrast, which
the Board did not mention, between the Board's emphasis on the
limited local authority in the areas of hiring and firing in Walgreen,
and its disparagement of the extensive local power in these areas in
Twenty-First Century and Waiakamilo, would appear to undercut the
continued precedential value of those earlier decisions. 120 In particular,
the Board's willingness to recognize the day-to-day authority of the
store managers in Walgreen constitutes a reaffirmation of Say-On.121
Regrettably, the Board's refusal in Walgreen to expressly overrule or
disapprove these earlier cases leaves room for argument concerning
the conclusiveness of the decision's reinstatement of the presumptive
appropriateness of single-store units.
The entire history of single-store unit determinations in the retail
chain industry has been one of change and transition. The Board's
earliest attempts to ensure maximum employee freedom of self-organi-
zation culminated in acknowledgment after Say-On of the presumptive
appropriateness of the single-store unit. The recent Mott's Shop-Rite,
Twenty-First Century, Waiakamilo and Gray Drug cases applied the
standards of local managerial independence, geographic proximity and
employee interchange in such a manner as to weaken seriously this
presumptive appropriateness. If allowed to continue, this trend could
have led to a substantial curtailment of employee freedom. 122 Fortu-
nately, the Walgreen decision appears to have precluded continuation
of the aberrant application of these standards. Unfortunately, this re-
cent period of vacillation may be interpreted as an indication that pre-
viously stable and acceptable Board standards are again in flux, thus
encouraging increased litigation.
CONCLUSION
Maximizing employee freedom of self-organization is the ultimate
goal of the Board's retail chain bargaining unit determinations. The
Board's experience has demonstrated that protection of this right
requires that single-store units be presumptively appropriate; its re-
cent tendency to undercut this presumption posed a threat to employee
119 Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 80 L.R.R.M. 1449, 1450 (1972).
Since the Board, in Walgreen, attempted to demonstrate that local authority existed,
omission of any reference to local suspension and discipline powers strongly implies that
these powers were not present.
120 But cf. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 80
L.R.R.M. 1081, 1087 (1972) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting).
121 See text at notes 55-56 supra. The strength of this reaffirmation of the Sav-On
approach is somewhat lessened by the fact that one member of the Board panel which
decided Walgreen recently argued that local bank managers lacked independence because
they did not control regional administrative or labor relations policies. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 80 L.R.R.M. 1081, 1087 & n.13 (1972)
(Kennedy, Member, dissenting). The local autonomy standards applied in Bank a/
America are identical to the standards used in retail chain decisions. See id. at 1082-84.
122 See note 105 supra.
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freedom. It is submitted that through Walgreen the Board has prop-
erly reaffirmed the single-store presumption, and that the Board should,
through express disapproval of such cases as Twenty-First Century
and Gray Drug, complete this reaffirmation, thereby discouraging
further unnecessary litigation. It is further submitted that the Board
should not destroy the balance it has previously sought to achieve in
its case-by-case search for appropriate multistore units by attempting
to make such groupings conform to employers' administrative districts.
STEPHEN R. MACDONALD
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